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“We want to understand intelligence, not only map its network of correlations with other 
constructs.  This means to reveal the functional – and ultimately, the neural – mechanisms 
underlying intelligent information processing.  Among the theoretical constructs within current 
theories of information processing, [working memory capacity] WMC is the one parameter that 
correlates best with measures of reasoning ability, and even with gf and g.  Therefore, 
investigating WMC, and its relationship with intelligence, is psychology’s best hope to date to 
understand intelligence.” – Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süß (2005) 
 
Working memory (WM) is a construct developed by cognitive psychologists to 
characterize and help further investigate how human beings maintain access to goal-relevant 
information in the face of concurrent processing and/or distraction.  For example, suppose you 
are fixing a cocktail for your spouse, who has just arrived home from work.  You need to 
remember that for the perfect Manhattan, you need 2 ounces of bourbon, 1 ounce of sweet 
vermouth, a dash of bitters and a splash of maraschino cherry juice, and at the same time you 
need to listen to your spouse tell you about his or her day.  WM is required to remember the 
ingredients without repeatedly consulting the recipe and to process the incoming information to 
understand the conversation.  Many important cognitive behaviors, beyond cocktail-mixing, such 
as reading, reasoning, and problem solving require WM because for each of these activities, 
some information must be maintained in an accessible state while new information is processed 
and potentially distracting information is ignored.  If you have experience preparing this 
particular drink then you could rely on procedural memory to perform the task.  If not, however, 
then WM is required to simultaneously remember the ingredients and comprehend the 
conversation.  
Working memory is a limited-capacity system.  That is, there is only so much 
information that can be maintained in an accessible state at one time.  There is also substantial 
variation in WM capacity (WMC) across individuals: Older children have greater capacity than 
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younger children, the elderly tend to have lesser capacity than younger adults, and patients with 
certain types of neural damage or disease have lesser capacity than healthy adults.  There is even 
a large degree of variation in WMC within healthy adult samples of subjects, such as within 
college-student samples.   
It is important to clarify at the outset the distinction between WM and WMC.  WM refers 
to the cognitive system required to maintain access to information in the face of concurrent 
processing and/or distraction (including mechanisms involved in stimulus representation, 
maintenance, manipulation, and retrieval), while WMC refers to the maximum amount of 
information an individual can maintain in a particular task that is designed to measure some 
aspect(s) of WM.  This has caused some confusion in the literature because different researchers 
operationally define WM in different ways, and this has implications for the relationship between 
WM and intelligence.  For example, two researchers may share the same exact definition of WM 
but they may operationalize WM differently, which could result in a different perspective on 
WMC and its correlates. 
The focus of the current chapter is on the relationship between WMC and fluid 
intelligence (gf) in healthy young adults.  Recent meta-analyses, conducted by two different 
groups of researchers, estimate the correlation between WMC and gf to be somewhere between r 
= .72 (Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005) and r = .85 (Oberauer et al., 2005).  Thus, according 
to these analyses, WMC accounts for at least half the variance in gf.  This is impressive, yet for 
this line of work to truly inform theoretical accounts of intelligence, we need to better understand 
the construct of WM and discuss the various ways in which it is measured.   
The emphasis here is on fluid intelligence rather than crystallized intelligence, general 
intelligence (g) or intelligence more broadly defined because most of the research linking WM to 
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the concept of intelligence has focused on fluid abilities and reasoning rather than acquired 
knowledge or skill (however see Hambrick, 2003; Hambrick & Engle, 2002; Hambrick & 
Oswald, 2005).  This is a natural place to focus our microscope because WM is most important 
in situations that do not allow for the use of prior knowledge and less important in situations in 
which skills and strategies guide behavior (Ackerman, 1988; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999).  That said, we acknowledge that fluid intelligence is a fuzzy concept.  The goal 
of the current chapter and much of the research reviewed in this chapter is to move away from 
such nebulous constructs and towards more precisely defined cognitive mechanisms that underlie 
complex cognition.  
The chapter begins with a brief review of the history of WM, followed by our own 
contemporary view of WM, which is largely shaped by Cowan’s model (1988; 1995; 2001; 
2005), but also incorporates ideas from individual differences research (for a review, see 
Unsworth and Engle, 2007), neuroimaging experiments (for a review, see Jonides et al., 2008), 
and computational models of WM (Ashby, Ell, Valentin, & Casale, 2005; O’Reilly & Frank, 
2006).  We then discuss the measurement of WMC.  These initial sections allow for a more 
informed discussion of the empirical work that has linked WMC and gf.  We then consider 
various theories on the relationship between WMC and gf, and propose a novel perspective, 
which we call the multi-mechanism view.  We conclude with a discussion of a recent trend in 
research on WM and intelligence: WM training and its effect on gf. 
Historical perspective on WM 
The concept of WM was first introduced by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) in their 
influential book, Plans and the Structure of Behavior.  The book, which is recognized as one of 
the milestones of the cognitive revolution, is also known for introducing the iterative problem 
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solving strategy known as TOTE, or Test – Operate – Test – Exit.  The TOTE strategy is often 
implemented as people carry out plans and pursue goal-directed behavior.  For example, when 
mixing the drink for your spouse, you could perform a Test (is the drink done?), and if not, then 
perform an Operation (add bourbon, which would require remembering that bourbon is one of 
the ingredients), and test again, and so on until the goal is achieved, at which point you Exit the 
plan.  Miller et al. realized that a dynamic and flexible short-term memory system is necessary to 
engage the TOTE strategy and to structure and execute a plan.  They referred to this short-term 
memory system as a type of “working memory” and speculated that it may be dependent upon 
the prefrontal cortex. 
The construct WM was introduced in the seminal chapter by Baddeley and Hitch (1974).  
Prior to their work, the dominant theoretical construct used to explain short-term memory 
performance was the short-term store (STS), epitomized by the so-called “modal model” of 
memory popular in the late 1960s (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968).  According to these models, 
the STS plays a central role in cognitive behavior, essentially serving as a gateway to further 
information processing.  It was therefore assumed that the STS would be crucial for a range of 
complex cognitive behaviors, such as planning, reasoning, and problem solving.  The problem 
with this approach, as reviewed by Baddeley and Hitch, was that disrupting the STS with a small 
memory load had very little impact on the performance of a range of complex cognitive tasks, 
particularly reasoning and planning.  Moreover, patients with severe STS deficits, for example, a 
digit span of only two items, functioned rather normally on a wide range of complex cognitive 
tasks (Shallice & Warrington, 1970; Warrington & Shallice, 1969).  This would not be possible 
if the STS were essential for information processing, as proposed by the modal model. 
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Baddeley and Hitch therefore proposed a more complex construct, working memory, that 
could maintain information in a readily accessible state, consistent with the STS, but also engage 
in concurrent processing, as well as maintain access to more information than the limited 
capacity STS could purportedly maintain.   According to this perspective, a small amount of 
information can be maintained via “slave” storage systems, akin to the STS, but more 
information can be processed and accessed via a central executive, which was poorly described 
in the initial WM model but has since been refined, and will be discussed in more detail below. 
Baddeley and Hitch argued that WM but not the STS plays an essential role in a range of 
complex cognitive tasks.  According to this perspective, WMC should be more predictive of 
cognitive performance than the capacity of the STS.  This prediction was first supported by an 
influential study by Daneman and Carpenter (1980), which explored the relationship between the 
capacity of the STS, WMC, and reading comprehension, as assessed by the Verbal Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (VSAT).  STS capacity was assessed using a word span task, in which a series of 
words were presented, one per second, and at the end of a series the subject was prompted to 
recall all the words in correct serial order.  Daneman and Carpenter developed a novel task to 
measure WMC.  The task was designed to require short-term storage, akin to word span, but also 
to require the simultaneous processing of new information.  Their reading span task required 
subjects to read a series of sentences aloud and remember the last word of each sentence for later 
recall.  Thus, the storage and recall demands of reading span are the same as for the word span 
task, but the reading span task has the additional requirement of reading sentences aloud while 
trying to remember words for later recall.  This type of task is thought to be an ecologically valid 
measure of the WM construct proposed by Baddeley and Hitch. 
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Consistent with the predictions of WM theory, the reading span task correlated more 
strongly with VSAT (r = .59) than the word span task (r = .35).  This may not seem at all 
surprising, given that both the VSAT and reading span involve reading.  However, subsequent 
work by Turner and Engle (1989) and others showed that the processing component of the WM 
span task does not have to involve reading for the task to be predictive of VSAT.  They had 
subjects solve simple mathematical operations while remembering words for later recall and 
showed, consistent with Daneman and Carpenter (1980), that the operation span task predicted 
VSAT more strongly than the word span task.  More recent research has shown that a variety of 
WM span tasks, similar in structure to reading span and operation span but with various 
processing and storage demands, are strongly predictive of a wide range of complex cognitive 
tasks, suggesting that the relationship between WM span performance and complex cognition is 
largely domain-general (e.g., Kane, Hambrick, Wilhelm, Payne, Tuholski, & Engle, 2004). 
In sum, WM is a relatively young construct in the field of psychology.  It was proposed 
as an alternative conception of short-term memory performance in an attempt to account for 
empirical evidence that was inconsistent with the modal model of memory that included a STS to 
explain short-term memory.  Original measures of WMC, such as reading span and operation 
span (also known as complex span tasks, see the measurement section below), were shown to be 
more strongly correlated with measures of complex cognition, including intelligence tests, than 
are simple span tasks, such as digit span and word span.  Recent work has called into question 
this simple distinction between complex and simple span tasks, which we will discuss later in the 
chapter, but here at the outset it is important to highlight that Baddeley and Hitch (1974) 
proposed WM as an alternative to the concept of a STS.  Indeed, referring to WM as a “system” 
and using the digit span task as a marker of the STS, Baddeley and Hitch concluded: 
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“This system [WM] appears to have something in common with the mechanism 
responsible for the digit span, being susceptible to disruption by a concurrent digit span 
task, and like the digit span showing signs of being based at least in part upon phonemic 
coding.  It should be noted, however, that the degree of disruption observed, even with a 
near-span concurrent memory load, was far from massive.  This suggests that although the 
digit span and working memory overlap, there appears to be a considerable component of 
working memory which is not taken up by the digit span task.” 
 
Contemporary view of WM 
Delineating the exact characteristics of WM and accounting for variation in WMC 
continues to be an extremely active area of research.  There are, therefore, several current 
theoretical models of WM and several explanations of WMC variation.  In this section we 
introduce just one view of WM, simply to provide the proper language necessary to explain WM 
measurement and the empirical data linking WMC to intelligence.  Later in the chapter we will 
consider alternative theoretical accounts.  Our view is largely shaped by Cowan’s model (1988; 
1995; 2001; 2005) rather than the recent incarnation of Baddeley’s model (2007) because we 
argue that Cowan’s model is more amenable to recent findings from neuroimaging studies of 
WM (Jonides et al., 2008; Postle, 2006).  We also prefer Cowan’s model to computational 
modeling approaches to WM (e.g., Ashby et al., 2005; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006) because 
Cowan’s model, while less specified mechanistically, addresses a broader range of phenomena, 
including the correlation between WMC and gf.   
Cowan’s model (see Figure 1) assumes that WM consists of activated long-term memory 
representations (see also Anderson, 1983; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Hebb, 1949) and a central 
executive responsible for cognitive control (for work that explains cognitive control without 
reference to a homuncular executive, see O’Reilly and Frank, 2006).  Within this activated set of 
representations, or “short-term store”, there is a focus of attention that can maintain 
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approximately 4 items in a readily accessible state (Cowan, 2001).  In other words, we can “think 
of” approximately 4 mental representations at one time.    
Our own view is quite similar to the model in Figure 1.  However, we make three 
modifications.  First, we prefer “unitary store” models of memory, rather than multiple store 
models and therefore do not think of the activated portion of LTM as a “store.”  The reason for 
this distinction is that there is very little neuroscience evidence to support the notion that there is 
a neurologically separate “buffer” responsible for the short-term storage of information (see 
Postle, 2006).  We acknowledge that there are memory phenomena that differ as a function of 
retention interval (for a review, see Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, and 
Usher, 2005) but we argue that these effects do not necessitate the assumption of a short-term 
store (for a review see Sederberg, Howard, and Kahana, 2008).  Second, recent work has shown 
that the focus of attention may be limited to just one item, depending on task demands (Garavan, 
1998; McElree, 2001; Nee & Jonides, 2008; Oberauer, 2002).  We therefore adopt Oberauer’s 
view that there are actually 3 layers of representation in WM: (1) the focus of attention, limited 
to one item; (2) the region of direct access, limited to approximately 4 items; and (3) 
representations active above baseline but no longer in the region of direct access.  To avoid 
confusion over Cowan and Oberauer’s terminology, we will use the phrase “scope of attention” 
to refer to the limited number of items that are readily accessible, recognizing that one item may 
have privileged access.  Third, and most important for the current chapter, we argue that 
Cowan’s view of WMC is too limited to account for complex cognitive activity, such as 
reasoning.  Complex cognitive behavior, such as reasoning, reading, and problem solving 
requires rapid access to more than 4 items at one time.  WM therefore must also consist of a 
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retrieval mechanism that allows for the rapid retrieval of information from LTM.  This notion 
has been referred to as long-term WM (Ericcson & Kintsch, 1995). 
Thus, we view WM as consisting of at least 3 main components: (1) cognitive control 
mechanisms (aka the central executive), which are most likely governed by the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), anterior-cingulate cortex (ACC) and subcortical structures including the basal ganglia and 
thalamus (Ashby et al. 2005; Botvinick, 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006); 
(2) 1-4 representations in the scope of attention, which are most likely maintained via activity in 
a frontal-parietal network (Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004); and (3) a retrieval 
mechanism responsible for the rapid retrieval of information from LTM.  This process is most 
likely achieved via cortical connections from the PFC to the medial temporal lobe (MTL), 
including the hippocampus (Chein, Moore, & Conway, 2010; Nee & Jonides, 2008; Ranganath, 
2006; O’Reilly & Norman, 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
Assuming this general architecture, consider Figure 2, from Jonides et al. (2008), which 
depicts the processing and neural representation of a single stimulus over the course of a few 
seconds in a hypothetical WM task, consisting of the presentation of 3 stimuli followed by a 
probe.  Note that three brain regions, PFC, parietal cortex, and MTL, are integral to processing.  
This framework is consistent with our view and with recent individual differences research on 
WM proposing that variation in WMC is partly due to active maintenance of information, 
achieved via PFC-parietal connections, and controlled retrieval of information achieved via PFC-
MTL connections (Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  We further propose that WMC is partly 
determined by cognitive control mechanisms, such as interference control (Burgess, Braver, 
Conway, & Gray, 2010).  We elaborate upon this multi-mechanism view later in the chapter.   
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Measurement of WMC  
There are several different WM tasks used in contemporary research.  These tasks vary in 
extremely important ways, which we will discuss below.  As well, the extent to which WMC 
predicts gf is largely dependent upon which set of tasks one uses to measure WMC.  Thus, a 
detailed discussion of various WM tasks is essential here.  We mainly consider WM tasks that 
have shown strong correlations with measures of gf in a domain-general fashion, for example, a 
verbal WM task predicting a spatial reasoning task and vice-versa.   
Complex span tasks 
As discussed above, complex span tasks, such as reading span (Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980), and operation span (Turner & Engle, 1989), were designed from the perspective of the 
original WM model.  Other complex span tasks include the counting span task (Case, Kurland, & 
Goldberg, 1982), as well as various spatial versions (see Kane et al., 2004; Shah & Miyake, 
1996).  Complex span tasks require participants to engage in some sort of simple processing task 
(e.g., reading unrelated sentences aloud or completing a math problem, as in reading span and 
operation span, respectively) between the presentations of to-be-remembered items (e.g., letters, 
words, digits, spatial locations).  After a list of items have been presented, typically between 2 
and 7, the subject is prompted to recall all the to-be-remembered items in correct serial order.   
For example, in the counting span task, the subject is presented with an array of items, 
such as blue and red circles and squares, and instructed to count a particular class of items, such 
as blue squares.  After counting aloud the subject is required to remember the total and is then 
presented with another array.  They again count the number of blue squares aloud and remember 
the total.  After a series of arrays they are required to recall all the totals in correct serial order.  
Thus, the storage and recall demands are the same as a simple digit span task, but there is the 
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additional requirement of counting the arrays, which demands controlled attention (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980) and therefore disrupts active maintenance of the digits.  Again, this is thought to 
be an ecologically valid measure of WM as proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) because it 
requires access to information (the digits) in the face of concurrent processing (counting) (for 
more details, see Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, and Engle, 2005).  
As mentioned above, complex span tasks reveal strong correlations with the VSAT (rs 
approximately .5, see Daneman and Carpenter, 1980, 1983; Turner and Engle, 1989) and other 
measures of reading comprehension (rs ranging from .50 to .90 depending on the comprehension 
task).  Complex span tasks also correlate highly with each other regardless of the processing and 
storage task (Turner & Engle, 1989).  For example, Kane et al. (2004) administered several 
verbal and several spatial complex span tasks and the range of correlations among all the tasks 
was r = .39 to r = .51.  Moreover, the correlation between latent variables representing spatial 
complex span and verbal complex span was r = .84 and the correlation between a latent variable 
representing all complex span tasks and gf was r = .76.  These results suggest that complex span 
tasks tap largely domain-general mechanisms, which makes them good candidates for exploring 
the relationship between WMC and gf. 
Simple span tasks 
Simple span tasks (e.g., digit span, word span, letter span), in contrast to complex span, 
do not include an interleaved processing task between the presentation of to-be-remembered 
items.  For example, in digit span, one digit is presented at a time, typically one per second, and 
after a series of digits the subject is asked to recall the digits in correct serial order.  Simple span 
tasks are among the oldest tasks used in memory research, for example, digit span was included 
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in the first intelligence test (Binet, 1903) and continue to be popular in standardized intelligence 
batteries (e.g., WAIS, WISC).  
As mentioned above, simple span tasks like digit span correlate less well with measures 
of complex cognition than complex span tasks (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & 
Minkoff, 2002; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Engle et al., 1999; 
Kane et al., 2004).  As well, simple span tasks are thought to be more domain-specific than 
complex span tasks, such that within-domain correlations among simple span tasks are higher 
than cross-domain correlations among simple span tasks (Kane et al., 2004).  Moreover, this 
domain-specific dominance is greater in simple span tasks than in complex span tasks (Kane et 
al., 2004).  These results would suggest that simple span tasks are not ideal candidates for 
exploring the relationship between WMC and gf.  However, recent research has shown that in 
some situations simple span tasks correlate as well with measures of gf as complex span tasks, 
and in some cases tap domain-general WM processes.  We discuss three of these situations here: 
(1) simple span with very rapid presentation of items, known as running span; (2) simple span 
with spatial stimuli, known as spatial simple span; and (3) simple span with long lists of items, 
known as long-list simple span.  
In a running memory span task (Pollack, Johnson, & Knaff, 1959), subjects are rapidly 
presented with a very long list of to-be-remembered items, the length of which is unpredictable.  
At the end of the list the subject is prompted to recall as many of the last few items as possible.  
Cowan et al. (2005) found that running span correlates well with various measures of cognitive 
ability in children and adults (see also Mukunda and Hall, 1992).  Cowan et al. argued that the 
rapid presentation (e.g., 4 items per second as compared to 1 item per second in digit span) 
prevents verbal rehearsal and that any WM memory task that prevents well-learned maintenance 
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strategies, such as rehearsal and chunking, will serve as a good predictor of complex cognition, 
including gf. 
This same explanation may account for the fact that simple span tasks with spatial stimuli 
tend to show strong correlations with measures of gf (Kane et al., 2004; Miyake et al., 2001).  For 
example, in a computerized version of the corsi blocks task, subjects are presented with a 4x4 
matrix and a series of cells in the matrix flash, one location at a time, typically at a rate of 1 
location per second.  At the end of a series, the subject is required to recall the flashed locations 
in correct serial order.  Kane et al. found that a latent variable derived from 3 spatial simple span 
tasks correlates as well with gf as a latent variable derived from 3 spatial complex span tasks.  It 
is important to note, however, that the gf variance accounted for by complex span and spatial 
simple span does not completely overlap, a point we will return to later in the chapter. 
Simple span tasks are also strong predictors of gf when only trials with long lists are 
considered.  Reanalyzing data from Kane et al. (2004), Unsworth and Engle (2006) showed that 
the correlation between simple span and gf increased as the number of to-be-remembered items 
in the span task increased.  In contrast, the correlation between complex span and gf remained 
stable as the number of items in the complex span task increased.  Also, the correlation between 
simple span and gf was equivalent to the correlation between complex span and gf for lists of 4 or 
more items.  Unsworth and Engle therefore argued that controlled retrieval of items is needed 
when the number of items exceeds the scope of attention, that is, approximately 4 items.  
According to this perspective, simple span tasks with long-lists require the same retrieval 
mechanism as complex span tasks because in each type of task, some information is lost from the 
scope of attention and must be recovered at the recall prompt.  In the case of long-list simple 
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span, some items are lost because the scope of attention is full and in the case of complex span 
items are lost because attention is shifted to the processing component of the task.   
Scope of attention tasks 
Running memory span and spatial simple span tasks with short lists, discussed above, 
might also be considered “scope of attention” tasks.  Cowan (2001) reviewed evidence from a 
variety of tasks that prevent simple maintenance strategies such as rehearsal and chunking and 
found that for most of these tasks the number of items that could be maintained was about 4.  As 
mentioned above, other researchers have shown that in some tasks one item in the focus of 
attention has privileged access (Garavan, 1998; McElree, 2001; Nee & Jonides, 2008; Oberauer, 
2002) but according to Cowan’s (2001) review the scope of attention is approximately 4 items.  
While running span and spatial simple span may be considered part of this class, they are not 
ideal measures of the scope (and control) of attention because the to-be-remembered items must 
each be recalled and therefore performance is susceptible to output interference.  In other words, 
it’s possible that more than 4 items are actively maintained but some representations are lost 
during recall.   
For this reason, the visual array comparison task (Luck & Vogel, 1997) is considered a 
better measure of the scope of attention.  There are several variants of the visual array 
comparison task but in a typical version subjects are briefly presented (e.g., 100 ms) with an 
array of several items that vary in shape and color.  After a short retention interval (e.g., 1 s), 
they are then presented with another array and asked to judge whether the two arrays are the 
same or different.  On half the trials the two arrays are the same and on the other half one item in 
the second array is different.  Thus, if all items in the initial array are maintained then subjects 
will be able to detect the change.  Most subjects achieve 100% accuracy on this task when the 
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number of items is less than 4 but performance begins to drop as the number of items in the array 
increases beyond 4.   
Tasks that are designed to measure the scope of attention, like visual array comparison 
tasks, have not been used in studies of WM and gf as often as complex and simple span tasks but 
recent research shows that scope of attention tasks account for nearly as much variance in 
cognitive ability as complex span tasks (Awh, Fukuda, Vogel, & Mayr, 2009; Cowan et al., 
2005; Cowan et al., 2006).  This work will be discussed in more detail below.   
Coordination and transformation tasks 
All of the above mentioned tasks require subjects to recall or recognize information that 
was explicitly presented.  In some WM tasks, which we label “coordination and transformation” 
tasks, subjects are presented with information and required to manipulate and/or transform that 
information to arrive at a correct response.  We include in this class backward span, letter-
number sequencing, alphabet recoding, as well as more complex tasks used by Kyllonen and 
Christal (1990) and Oberauer and colleagues  (Oberauer et al., 2003; Oberauer, 2004; Süß et al., 
2002). 
Backward span tasks are similar to simple span tasks except that the subject is required to 
recall the items in reverse order.  Thus, the internal representation of the list must be transformed 
for successful performance.  In letter-number sequencing, the subject is presented with a 
sequence of letters and numbers and required to recall first the letters in alphabetical order and 
then the numbers in chronological order.  In alphabet recoding the subject is required to perform 
addition and subtraction using the alphabet, e.g., C – 2 = A.  The subject is presented with a 
problem and required to generate the answer.  Difficulty is manipulated by varying the number 
of letters presented, e.g., CD – 2 = AB. 
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Kyllonen and Christal (1990) found very strong correlations between WMC and 
reasoning ability, using a variety of WM tasks that can all be considered in this “coordination 
and transformation” class (rs between .79 and .91).  Also, Oberauer and colleagues showed that 
the correlation between WMC and gf does not depend upon whether WM is measured using 
complex span tasks or these types of transformation tasks, suggesting that coordination and 
transformation tasks tap the same mechanisms as complex span tasks.  Importantly, this suggests 
that the dual-task nature of complex span tasks (i.e., processing and storage) is not necessary for 
a WM task to be predictive of gf, a point we return to below.   
N-back tasks 
In an n-back task the subject is presented with a series of stimuli, one at a time, typically 
one every 2-3 seconds, and must determine if the current stimulus matches the one presented n-
back.  The stimuli may be verbal, such as letters or words, or visual objects, or spatial locations.  
N-back tasks have been used extensively in fMRI experiments, and more recently in WM 
training experiments.  Gray, Chabris, and Braver (2003) showed that a verbal n-back task was a 
strong predictor of a spatial reasoning task (Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices), making n-
back a class of WM tasks to consider as we discuss the relationship between WMC and gf. 
Empirical evidence linking WMC and gf  
Now that we have considered various measures of WMC, we turn to a review of the 
empirical evidence linking WMC and gf.  As mentioned above, two recent meta-analyses, 
conducted by two different groups of researchers, estimated the correlation between WMC and gf 
to be somewhere between r = .72 (Kane et al., 2005) and r = .85 (Oberauer et al., 2005).  Kane et 
al. summarized the studies included in their meta-analysis in a table, which is reproduced here 
(see Table 1).  Each of the studies included in the meta-analysis administered several tests of 
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WMC and several tests of gf and latent variable analysis was used to determine the strength of 
the relationship between the two constructs.  A variety of WM tasks were used in these studies, 
including complex span, simple span, and coordination and transformation tasks.  None of the 
studies referenced in Table 1 used tests designed to measure the scope of attention, like visual 
array comparison, or n-back tasks. 
One finding that has emerged from these studies is that complex span tasks are a stronger 
predictor of gf than simple span (Conway et al., 2002; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & 
Merikle, 1996; Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004).  However, as mentioned above, more recent 
research has demonstrated that this is only true for verbal simple span tasks (Kane et al., 2004; 
Miyake et al., 2001), and then, it is only true for verbal simple span tasks that do not include long 
lists (Unsworth & Engle, 2006, 2007). Unsworth and Engle have now repeatedly shown that 
simple span tasks with long lists correlate as strongly with measures of gf as complex span tasks.  
Also, Kane et al. found that simple span tasks with spatial stimuli revealed correlations with 
measures of gf as high as complex span tasks did. 
These recent findings have important implications for theories of the relationship 
between WMC and gf.  However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, simple span 
with spatial stimuli, and simple span with long lists, the variance explained in gf is not entirely 
the same as the variance explained by complex span.  To illustrate this, we re-analyzed data from 
Kane et al. (2004).  We conducted a series of hierarchical regression analyses to determine the 
variance in gf that is either uniquely or commonly explained by complex span and simple span 
(cf., Chuah & Mayberry, 1999).  The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 3, panel A.  
As the figure illustrates, simple span with spatial stimuli accounts for a substantial portion of 
variance in gf, and some of that variance is shared with complex span but some of it is unique to 
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simple span with spatial stimuli.  At first glance, this finding indicates that spatial simple span is 
tapping a mechanism that is important to gf but is not common to complex span.  However, the 
battery of reasoning tasks used by Kane et al. to derive the gf factor had a slight bias towards 
spatial reasoning tests.  When we model gf from only the verbal reasoning tests we observe a 
different result (see Figure 3, panel B).  This suggests that spatial simple span does NOT account 
for any domain-general variance in gf above and beyond complex span.  
Unsworth and Engle (2006) conducted a similar analysis with respect to the relationship 
between complex span, simple span with short and long lists, and gf.  The results of their analysis 
are reproduced here in Figure 4.  As with simple span with spatial stimuli, simple span with long 
lists (5-7 items) accounts for a substantial percentage of variance in gf (22.5%).  However, most 
of that variance is shared with complex span (79%).  This suggests that simple span with long 
lists and complex span tap similar mechanisms. 
As mentioned above, none of the studies in the meta-analyses conducted by Kane et al. 
(2005) included tasks specifically designed to measure the scope of attention.  However, Cowan 
and his colleagues have conducted several recent studies to explore the relationship between 
scope of attention tasks, complex span, and cognitive ability in both children and adults.  The 
results from just one of these studies are reproduced in Figure 5.  Here we see that the variance in 
gf accounted for by scope of attention tasks is largely shared by complex span tasks but that 
complex span tasks account for variance in gf above and beyond scope of attention tasks.  This 
result suggests that complex span and scope of attention tasks tap some overlapping mechanisms 
but complex span taps something that is important to gf that is not required by scope of attention 
tasks. 
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Finally, recent studies by Jeremy Gray and colleagues have considered the relationship 
among complex span, gf, and n-back.  An important feature of Gray’s n-back task is the inclusion 
of lure trials, which are trials in which the current stimulus matches a recently presented 
stimulus, but not the one n-back (e.g., n-1 or n+1 back).  Accuracy to lure trials is lower than 
accuracy to non-lure foils and accuracy to lure trials correlates more strongly with complex span 
tasks and with tests of gf than accuracy to non-lure trials (Burgess et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2003; 
Kane et al., 2007).  Burgess et al. examined the relationship between lure accuracy, complex 
span, and gf.  The results of their analyses are reproduced in Figure 6.  Here again, n-back and 
complex span account for much of the same variance in gf but complex span accounts for a 
substantial portion of variance in gf that is not explained by n-back (see also Kane et al., 2007).  
As with the scope of attention tasks, this suggests that complex span and n-back tap some 
mechanisms that are common and important to gf but that they also tap some mechanisms that 
are unique and important to gf. 
Theoretical accounts of the link between WM and gf 
Several theoretical accounts have been offered to account for the strong relationship 
between WMC and gf.  It should be stated at the outset that these different accounts vary more in 
terms of emphasis and approach than they do in terms of the data they explain or the predictions 
they make.  Furthermore, we believe that these various accounts can be encompassed by one 
theory, our multi-mechanism view, which we discuss at the end of this section. 
Executive attention 
The first comprehensive theoretical account of the relationship between WMC and gf was 
offered by Engle and colleagues, and particularly in the work of Engle and Kane (Engle & Kane, 
2004; Kane & Engle, 2002).  This view has been referred to as the “controlled attention” or 
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“executive attention” theory.  According to this perspective, individuals with greater cognitive 
control mechanisms, such as goal maintenance, selective attention, and interference resolution 
(inhibition) will perform better on a variety of tasks, including measures of WMC and tests of gf.  
There is a great deal of support for this theory, and an exhaustive review is not possible here.  
Instead, we will highlight a few important findings.  First, performance on various WM tasks has 
been linked to mechanisms of cognitive control, such as inhibition.  For example, individuals 
who perform better on complex span tasks do so in part because they are better at resolving 
proactive interference from previous trials (Bunting, 2006; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  Similarly, 
individuals who perform better on complex span tasks are also more accurate on lure trials in the 
n-back task and lure trials predict gf better than non-lure trials (Burgess et al., 2010; Gray et al., 
2003; Kane et al., 2007).  As well, tasks that place heavy demands on cognitive control but little 
demand on memory predict gf (Dempster & Corkill, 1999).   
Perhaps most strikingly, the correlation between complex span and gf increases as a 
function of the amount of proactive interference (PI) in the task (Bunting, 2006).  Bunting had 
subjects perform a complex span task and manipulated the category from which the to-be-
remembered items were drawn (words or digits).  The category was repeated for 3 items (to build 
PI) and then switched on the fourth item (to release PI).  The correlation between complex span 
and Ravens Progressive Matrices, a marker of gf, increased linearly as PI increased and dropped 
significantly when PI was released.  
While executive attention theory has enjoyed considerable support, a fair criticism is that 
the empirical evidence is overly reliant on studies using complex span tasks.  This is problematic 
because complex span tasks are, as the name suggests, complex.  Thus, while Engle and 
colleagues have argued that “executive attention” is the primary source of variation in these 
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tasks, other researchers have emphasized the fact that other sources of variance are at play as 
well, such as domain-specific abilities required to perform the processing component of the task 
(e.g., mathematical ability, in the case of operation span; or verbal ability, in the case of reading 
span) (Bayliss, Jarrold, Gunn, & Baddeley, 2003; Daneman & Carpenter, 1983; Shah & Miyake, 
1996).  As well, performance of complex span tasks can be influenced by strategy deployment, 
such that a person may perform above average on a complex span task because he or she 
implements an effective strategy, not because the person actually has superior WMC (Dunlosky 
& Kane, 2007; McNamara & Scott, 2001; Turley-Ames & Whitfield, 2003).  
Scope and control of attention 
 According to Cowan’s approach, the scope of attention is limited to about 4 items and 
individual differences in the scope and control of attention are what drive the correlation between 
measures of WMC and gf. (for a similar perspective on capacity limitations, see Drew and Vogel, 
2009).  The difference between Cowan’s approach and that of Engle and colleagues, however, 
may be just one of emphasis.  Cowan’s recent work has emphasized the scope of attention while 
Engle’s recent work, particularly that of Unsworth and Engle, has emphasized retrieval of 
information that has been lost from the focus of attention.  Thus, we do not see these views as 
necessarily incompatible and we incorporate both into our multi-mechanism view, articulated 
below.  One issue of debate, however, is whether scope of attention tests of WMC, like visual 
array comparison, account for the same variance in gf as complex span tasks.  The results of 
Cowan et al. (2005), reproduced here in Figure 5, suggest that complex span tasks have 
something in common with gf that scope of attention tasks do not.  However, Cowan et al. 
reported confirmatory factor analyses indicating that a two-factor model of the WM tasks, 
dissociating scope of attention and complex span, did NOT fit the data better than a single-factor 
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model.  Also, more recent work has demonstrated correlations between scope of attention tasks 
and gf that are as strong as correlations typically observed between complex span tasks and gf 
(Awh et al., 2009; Cowan et al., 2006).  More research is needed to further investigate the 
relationship between scope of attention tasks, complex span tasks, and gf.  
Binding limits 
Oberauer and colleagues characterize the relationship between WMC and gf as one of 
“binding limits” rather than one of attention.  Oberauer argues that memory requires the binding 
of features into objects and the binding of objects into episodes.  There is a limit to the number of 
bindings that can be actively maintained at once and this causes WMC.  Importantly, more 
complex tasks require more bindings, and Oberauer has shown that more complex WM tasks 
tend to show stronger correlations with tests of gf, which themselves are complex tasks.  Of 
particular importance is the finding, mentioned above, that WM tasks that require multiple 
bindings, such as coordination and transformation tasks, predict gf just as well as complex span 
tasks, and account for largely the same variance in gf as complex span tasks (Oberauer et al., 
2003; Süß et al., 2002).  This suggests that the dual-task nature of complex span tasks is not 
necessary to predict gf and calls into question a basic tenet of executive attention theory, that is, 
that cognitive control mechanisms are responsible for the relationship between WMC and gf.  
That said, an unresolved issue is the relationship between attention and binding.  Hence, it isn’t 
clear if Oberauer’s view is incompatible with Engle and/or Cowan’s view. 
Active maintenance and controlled retrieval 
Unsworth and Engle (2007) argue that there are two dissociable domain-general 
mechanisms that influence WMC: (1) a dynamic attention component that is responsible for 
maintaining information in an accessible state; and (2) a probabilistic cue-dependent search 
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component, which is responsible for searching for information that has been lost from the focus 
of attention.  For example, as a subject performs a complex span task, the dynamic attention 
component is necessary to coordinate the processing and storage demands of the task and to 
maintain the to-be-remembered items in an accessible state.  The search component is necessary 
at the recall prompt to recover to-be-remembered items that may have been lost from the focus of 
attention because of the demands of the processing component of the task. 
Empirical support for this theory comes from simple span tasks with long lists and from 
serial free recall tasks designed to assess primacy and recency effects.  As mentioned above, 
Unsworth and Engle (2006; 2007) have shown that simple span tasks with long lists correlate as 
well with gf as measures of complex span tasks and much of the variance explained by simple 
span with long lists is shared with complex span (see Figure 4).  They argue that simple span 
with long lists taps the same controlled retrieval mechanism as complex span because the focus 
of attention is overloaded and items displaced from the focus of attention must be recovered 
during recall.  More recent work demonstrates that individual differences in the primacy portion 
of free recall account for different variance in gf than individual differences in the recency 
portion (Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2010).  Unsworth et al. argue that variance in the 
primacy effect is driven by individual differences in controlled retrieval and variance in the 
recency effect is driven by individual differences in active maintenance via attention.   
While they do not provide a neural model of their theory, the dynamic attentional 
processes implicated in their account are consistent with recent computational models of WM 
that implicate PFC, ACC, and parietal cortex as regions involved in the active maintenance, 
updating, and monitoring of information in WM (Botvinick et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2001; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006).  Indeed, neuroimaging studies of complex span 
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tasks show that PFC, ACC, and parietal areas are more strongly recruited in complex span tasks 
than during simple span tasks (Bunge et al., 2000; Chein et al., 2010; Kondo et al., 2004; Osaka 
et al., 2003; Osaka et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2001).  
Unsworth and Engle further speculate that the medial temporal lobes (MTL) are also 
important for WM performance, which is a relatively novel prediction (but see Ranganath, 
2006).  In particular, they argue that the cue-dependent search process implicated during recall 
relies on coordinated activity between PFC and MTL. This view is also consistent with 
computational models that examine the interaction between PFC and MTL in a variety of 
memory tasks (O’Reilly & Norman, 2002).  Indeed, a recent fMRI study indicates greater PFC 
and hippocampal activity during recall in complex span tasks than during recall in simple span 
tasks (Chein et al., 2010). 
A multi-mechanism view 
 
 We argue that there are multiple domain-general cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between WMC and gf.  Our view is largely shaped by Unsworth and Engle’s account 
discussed above, but also by computational models and neuroimaging data that similarly 
fractionate WM into dissociable mechanisms.  Most important among these are the scope and 
control of attention, updating and conflict monitoring, interference resolution, and controlled 
retrieval.  These mechanisms have been linked to neural activity in specific brain regions: PFC-
parietal connections for the scope and control of attention (Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004); a PFC-ACC-basal ganglia-thalamus network for updating and conflict 
monitoring (Ashby et al. 2005; Botvinick, 2007; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006); inferior frontal cortex 
for interference resolution (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004); and PFC-hippocampal 
connections for controlled retrieval (Chein, et al., 2010; Nee & Jonides, 2008; Ranganath, 2006). 
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This multi-mechanism view of the relationship between WMC and gf is consistent with 
the parieto-frontal integration theory (P-FIT) of intelligence (Jung & Haier, 2007), according to 
which, intelligence and reasoning are particularly dependent upon connections between parietal 
and pre-frontal cortices.  The current view is consistent with P-FIT but suggests that sub-cortical 
structures, such as the basal ganglia and thalamus, and medial temporal regions, such as the 
hippocampus, are also important.  In fact, at the end of their review, Jung and Haier (2007) 
speculated; “there are likely other brain regions critical to intelligence and the implementation of 
intelligent behavior, including regions identified in studies of discrete cognitive processes, such 
as the basal ganglia, thalamus, hippocampus, and cerebellum”.  
 Multi-mechanism, or multiple component theories of intelligence are not new.  In fact, they 
date back to the beginning of the debate about the basis of Spearman’s g (Thompson, 1916).  
Spearman described the underlying source of variance in g as a unitary construct, reflecting some 
sort of cognitive resource, or “mental energy”.  However, early critics of Spearman’s work 
illustrated that g could be caused by multiple factors as long as the battery of tasks from which g 
is derived tap all of these various factors in an overlapping fashion.  That is, any one individual 
task does not have to tap all the common factors across a battery of tasks but each task must have 
at least one factor in common with another task.  These theories have been referred to as 
“sampling theories” of g and are best represented by the work of Thomson (1916) and Thorndike 
(1927).  According to sampling theories, g will emerge from a battery of tasks that “sample” an 
array of “elements” that, in combination, constitute the cognitive abilities measured by the tests 
(Jensen, 1998).  Thomson (1916) provided a mathematical proof of this by randomly sampling 
various sized groups of digits.  In his terms, the groups represented mental tests and the digits 
represented elements.  In our view, the “elements” are the various domain-general mechanisms 
 27 
tapped by the mental tests.  Thomson showed that the groups of digits will be correlated with 
each other in terms of the number of digits any two random samples have in common.  Thus, g 
may not reflect a unitary construct.  Instead, g will emerge from a battery of tasks that tap 
various important domain-general mechanisms in an overlapping fashion. 
Recent trend: Training WM to boost intelligence 
One interpretation of the relationship between WMC and gf is that WMC constrains 
intelligent behavior.  According to this perspective, if people were able to increase their WMC 
then they would be able to effectively increase their intelligence.  Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, 
and Perrig (2008) attempted to do just this and made what has been described as a “landmark” 
finding: training on a continuously adaptive dual n-back task transfers to performance on tests of 
gf, such that subjects who underwent WM training performed better on tests of fluid intelligence 
than a control group that did not get WM training.  This research was featured in the New York 
Times (Wang & Aamodt, 2009) and has formed the basis of an iPhone application called “IQ 
Boost.”   
Subjects in the study underwent either 8, 12, 17 or 19 days of training on a continuously 
adaptive dual n-back task.  The dual n-back consisted of two strings of stimuli, letters and spatial 
locations (see Figure 7).  Subjects were instructed to indicate whether the current stimulus was 
the same as the stimulus n back in the series.  The value of n increased or decreased from block 
to block as performance improved or worsened.  Thus, the task was titrated to individual 
performance and was consistently demanding.  Participants were pre- and post-tested on 
different forms of a measure of gf.  A control group did not undergo any training and completed 
only the pre- and post-test measures.  As previously mentioned, the training groups underwent 8, 
12, 17 or 19 days of n-back training, though not all groups received the same format of the test of 
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gf.  This aspect of the design has received some criticism, as described below. 
Jaeggi et al. found that all the training groups showed improvements in gf, and the 
magnitude of the improvement increased with more training (see Figure 8).  It should be noted 
that the control group also showed a significant increase in gf, most likely due to practice effects.  
After taking pre-test gf scores into account (as a covariate) a trend toward significant group 
differences emerged after 12 training days.  After 17 training days, the difference in gf between 
the training and control group was significant. Thus, transfer of training to gf was dosage 
dependent – gains in fluid intelligence were a function of the amount of training.  If reliable, this 
effect clearly has tremendous implications.  However, several critiques of this work have been 
presented recently.  We consider these, as well as our own, below. 
One curious aspect of the Jaeggi et al. results, which is particularly relevant to this 
chapter, is that subjects showed training related transfer to digit span but not to the reading span 
task.  As mentioned above, reading span is considered a complex span task, dependent upon 
active maintenance and controlled retrieval, whereas n-back is considered an updating task, 
dependent upon active maintenance and cognitive control but not necessarily retrieval (indeed, 
fMRI studies of n-back typically show prefrontal and parietal activation but not hippocampal 
activation).  Thus, an intriguing possibility is that their WM training regimen tapped the PFC-
parietal aspect of WM but not the PFC-MTL component and that a more comprehensive training 
regimen would show even stronger gains in gf.   
Jaeggi et al.’s choice of tasks to assess gf has also come under criticism.  Moody (2009) 
made the important point that while the group that received 8 days of training was tested on 
Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) and showed little improvement between pre- 
and post-tests, the other groups, that did show improvement, were tested using the Bochumer 
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Matrices Test (BOMAT) (Hossiep, Turck & Hasella, 1999).  Jaeggi et al. provide no rationale 
for switching from one test to another.  RAPM and BOMAT are similar in that they both use 
visual analogies in matrix format and both tests are progressive, such that the items become 
successively more difficult.  Typical administration of the BOMAT takes 45 minutes, however 
Jaeggi et al. only allowed 10 minutes.  Moody argues that the speeded nature of the 
administration did not allow subjects to advance to more difficult problems, and thus, 
“transformed it from a test of fluid intelligence into a speed test of ability to solve the easier 
visual analogies” (Moody, pp. 327).   
Jaeggi et al. are not the first to target improvements in cognition via WM training, nor or 
they the first to document transfer of WM training to a non-trained task.  Klingberg, Forssberg, 
and Westerberg (2002) administered intensive and adaptive WM training to young adults with 
and without ADHD.  These authors observed significant improvements post-training on RAPM 
as well as on a non-trained visuo-spatial WM task in both groups.  A relative strength of this 
investigation was the use of an active control group that played computer games over the 
duration of training so as to control for the amount of time spent in front of the computer.  A 
weakness of this study however, was the small sample size of only 4 participants.  Olesen, 
Westerberg and Klingberg (2003) were able to pinpoint a biological mechanism for increased 
WMC after WM training for 5 weeks in 3 subjects.  The authors propose that after training, the 
increased activity in the middle frontal gyrus and superior and inferior parietal cortices might be 
indicators of training-induced plasticity.  While this finding is very suggestive, the claim must be 
supported by future studies with a larger sample size. 
Future investigations of WM training and transfer to intelligence should aim to find 
transfer to complex span tasks for the reasons detailed above.  Moreover, it is crucial that pre- 
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and post-measures of gf be consistent and administered in a valid manner. Further, an active 
control group would address the issue of training gains based on repeated exposure to a testing 
environment alone.  Lastly, perhaps most importantly, the durability of training must be 
assessed.  Jaeggi et al. fail to address the durability of the transfer of training to gf.  Their claims 
about increases in fluid intelligence would be further substantiated if they were able to 
demonstrate that these changes are not transient. A longitudinal follow up on participants’ gf 
would address this issue. 
Conclusion 
Working memory has emerged as a very useful construct in the field of psychology.  
Various measures of WMC have been shown to correlate quite strongly with measures of 
intelligence, accounting for at least half the variance in gf.  We argue that these correlations exist 
because tests of WMC and tests of gf tap multiple domain-general cognitive mechanisms 
required for the active maintenance and rapid controlled retrieval of information.  Also, recent 
research indicates that training WM, or specific aspects of WM, increases gf, although more 
research is necessary to establish the reliability and durability of these results.   
More research is also needed to better specify the various mechanisms underlying 
performance of WM and reasoning tests.  Neuroimaging studies on healthy adults and 
neuropsychological tests of patients with various neurological damage or disease will be 
especially fruitful.  For example, recent fMRI studies have illustrated that individual differences 
in activity in PFC during a WM task partly accounts for the relationship between WMC and gf 
(Burgess et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2003).  One intriguing possibility is that individual differences 
in activity in different brain regions (or network of regions) accounts for different variance in gf.  
For example, based on the work of Unsworth and Engle (2007), it may be possible to 
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demonstrate that individual differences in activity in the PFC, ACC, and parietal cortex, 
reflecting active maintenance during a WM task, accounts for different variance in gf than 
individual differences in activity in PFC and hippocampus, reflecting controlled retrieval during 
a WM task.  
The multi-mechanism view also has implications for research on WM training and for 
cognitive therapy for the elderly and patients with neural damage or disease.  That is, rather than 
treat WM as a global construct, training and remediation could be tailored more specifically.  
Instead of “WM training” we envisage mechanism-specific training.  That is, training a specific 
domain-general cognitive mechanism should result in improved performance across a variety of 
tasks.  There is now some research supporting this idea (Dahlin, Neely, Larsson, Bäckman, & 
Nyberg, 2009; Karbach & Kray, in press) but again, more work is needed to confirm the 
reliability and durability of these results.  
In sum, WMC is strongly correlated with gf.  We argue that the relationship between 
these constructs is driven by the operation of multiple domain-general cognitive mechanisms that 
are required for the performance of tasks designed to measure WMC and for the performance of 
test batteries designed to assess fluid intelligence.  Future research in cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience will hopefully refine our understanding of these underlying mechanisms, which 
will in turn sharpen the multi-mechanism view. 
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FIGURE 1 
Cowan, N. (1988). Evolving conceptions of memory storage, selective attention, and their mutual 
constraints within the human information processing system. Psychological Bulletin, 104, 163-
191 
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FIGURE 2 
Jonides, J., Lewis, R.L., Nee, D.E., Lustig, C.A., Berman, M.G., and Moore K.S. (2008). The mind and 
brain of short-term memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 193-224. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The processing and neural representation of one item in memory over the course of a few 
seconds in a hypothetical short-term memory task, assuming a simple single-item focus 
architecture. The cognitive events are demarcated at the top; the task events, at the bottom. The 
colored layers depict the extent to which different brain areas contribute to the representation of 
the item over time, at distinct functional stages of short-term memory processing. The colored 
layers also distinguish two basic types of neural representation: Solid layers depict memory 
supported by a coherent pattern of active neural firing, and hashed layers depict memory 
supported by changes in synaptic patterns. The example task requires processing and 
remembering three visual items; the figure traces the representation of the first item only. In this 
task, the three items are sequentially presented, and each is followed by a delay period. After the 
delay following the third item, a probe appears that requires retrieval of the first item.  
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FIGURE 3 
Reanalysis of Kane et al. 2004 
 
 
 
Panel A: Complex span, spatial simple span, and verbal simple span predicting Gf indexed by verbal 
reasoning, spatial reasoning, and figural matrix tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Complex span, spatial simple span and verbal simple span predicting verbal reasoning 
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FIGURE 4 
Reanalysis of  
Unsworth, N., & Engle, R.W.  (2006).  Simple and complex memory spans and their relation to fluid 
abilities:  Evidence from list-length effects.  Journal of Memory and Language, 54, 68-80. 
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FIGURE 5 
Reanalysis of  
Cowan, N., Elliott, E. M., Saults, J. S., Morey, C. C., Mattox, S., Hismjatullina, A., & Conway, A. R. A. 
(2005). On the capacity of attention: Its estimation and its role in working memory and cognitive 
aptitudes. Cognitive Psychology, 51, 42-100. 
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FIGURE 6 
Reanalysis of  
Burgess, G. C., Braver, T. S., Conway, A. R. A., & Gray, J. R. (2010). Neural mechanisms of interference 
control underlie the relationship between fluid intelligence and working memory span. 
Manuscript under review. 
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FIGURES 7&8 
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W. J. (2008). Improving fluid intelligence with 
training on working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(19), 6829-
6833. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
The n-back task that was used as the training task, illustrated for a 2-back condition. The letters 
were presented auditorily at the same rate as the spatial material was presented visually. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Transfer effects. (a) Mean values and corresponding standard errors of the fluid intelligence test 
scores for the control and the trained groups, collapsed over training time. (b) The gain scores 
(posttest minus pretest scores) of the intelligence improvement plotted for training group as a 
function of training time. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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